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WATER FEDERALISM AND THE ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS' ROLE IN EASTERN STATES WATER
ALLOCATION
Robert Haskell Abrams*
I. INTRODUCTION

It is black letter constitutional theory that the several states are
the masters of their property law, and hence their water law,' unless
the states in making their property law rules impinge on some federal
constitutional guarantee, such as the prohibition against takings of
property or the dormant commerce clause For that reason, states
have been free to adopt regimes as widely different as reasonable use
riparianism and prior appropriation, depending on local conditions
and perceived needs. Since nationhood, states located in the relatively
humid eastern regions of the United States have maintained as the
core aspect of their water law the riparian rights doctrine to allocate
the use of surface water.' Those state law precepts appeared primarily
in the case law and, at times, as confirmed and loosely codified in statutory enactments adopting common law reasonable use riparianism
as the guiding principle for determining water rights More recently
and increasingly, states are enacting administrative permit systems,
while retaining riparianism's correlative sharing of the water as the
operative allocative principle that determines rights of use of the
available water.' The core principles of "water federalism" begin with
the recognition of state law water allocation.
Operating in a parallel universe, superimposed on the same physical water resource network, is the United States Army Corps of En* Professor of Law, Florida A & M University, College of Law.
1. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, 1-2 (Thompson
Reuters/West 2008) (2008) [herinafter TARLOCK TREATISE].
2. U.S. CONST. Amends. V and XIV; see also Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd.
v. Okla Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990).
3. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (holding that a Nebraska statutory
restriction on certain water resources violated the commerce clause because it impermissibly burdened interstate commerce).
4. See, e.g., JOSEPH SAX, BARTON THOMPSON, JR., JOHN LESHY, ROBERT
ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 12-13 (Thompson West 4th ed.
2006) [hereinafter SAX, LCWR 4th]. See, e.g., Tarlock Treatise 1-2.
5. See, e.g., Pyle v. Gilbert, 245 Ga. 403, 265 S.E.2d 584 (1980).
6. See Peter Davis, Eastern Water Division Permit Status: Precedents for Missouri?, 47 Mo. L. REV. 429, 477 (1982). See also, AM. SOC'Y OF CIVIL ENG'RS,
REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE, § 2R-1-01 (2004).
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gineers (Corps). Up through the end of the nineteenth century, the
Corps' principal and nearly exclusive role in regard to the nation's
waters was to promote and enhance navigation. The Corps discharged
that function by constructing various public works projects allied with
that on-stream mission, building lock and dam systems, undertaking
dredging, and preventing obstruction of navigation.7 Even for a half
century thereafter, the Corps' direct activities had only occasional water allocation consequences, although its regulatory power over navigation and construction of diversion works in navigable waters at
times gave it jurisdiction to review major water supply projects. The
best known example of this latter authority is the so-called "Chicago
Diversion," a water works project that required the Corps' approval
by which that city was able to divert at a rate as high as 8500 cubic feet
per second (cfs) from Lake Michigan and channel the water southward into the Mississippi River Basin, where it would not have naturally flowed! In that role as guardian of navigation, the Corps did not
involve itself in the water law of the states. The states' primacy in water allocation remained the hallmark of water federalism to the extent
that anyone even considered the topic.
Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, the scope of
congressional initiatives carried out by the Corps expanded into the
multipurpose dam building business9 and implementing an expanding
array of public purposes that included flood control, hydropower, flat
water recreation, and even irrigation and municipal water supply.' °
With the expanded activities and the broader federal purposes the
Corps was being directed to pursue, the easy co-existence of state water rights and Corps' activities affecting water use faced a new potential for conflict. Even then, conflict between the Corps' pursuit of its

7. See, e.g., Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 §§ 10, 15, 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 409
(2006).
8. See Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 415-18 (1929). Although Illinois
claimed that the Corps' issuance of a permit amounted to federal authorization for the
diversion and resulting allocation of water rights, the Supreme Court rejected this
argument and held that the Corps permit was merely a response to the public health
threat of the sewage and not a federal decision regarding management of the navigable waters of the Great Lakes. Id. For a complete discussion of the Chicago Diversion and the Wisconsin v. Illinois cases, see Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal
Federalism:Interstate Water Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L.
REv. 405,419-22 (2006).
9. The leading example of the expansion is the Flood Control Act of 1946, which
authorized massive projects in the Missouri Basin. The statute set general parameters
and each individual project has its own specific authorizing legislation and purposes.
10. Water Supply Act of 1958, 43 U.S.C. § 390b (2006).
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authorized activities and state law allocation of water remained more
potential than real. Many of the Corps projects being proposed, approved, and funded had strong state support and were not antithetical
to any existing or near-term foreseeable pattern of water use being
made in accordance with state created water rights or water management policies. As with the survival of the imprecise underlying riparian rights water use allocation regime, in most places where Corps'
dams were being built, there was plenty of water to go around and
significant water user conflicts were rare.1 The Corps' programmatic
efforts that provided flood control, hydropower generation, recreational opportunities, and water supply were welcomed by the states.
Seldom, if ever, was there a discernible shortage of water that called
for hard choices about water allocation.
In the absence of conflict between Corps' water control actions
and state water use prerogatives, there was no test posed for water
federalism in the East. The remainder of this Article proceeds on the
premise that water is no longer relatively plentiful in an increasing
number of basins found in the humid eastern states. The presence of
Corps' facilities in basins now experiencing short supply opens the
door to state and federal water allocation conflict that calls for mediation under the principles of water federalism, a doctrine that has varied considerably over time. This article will recount those changes in
doctrine and then consider whether any of the past variations of water
federalism are well-suited to contemporary conditions. Finding that
they may not be, the Conclusion suggests what appear to be fruitful
avenues for forging a now role for the Corps that better supports the
core water federalism recognition of state water allocations than does
the emerging status quo.

II. THE NEW REALITY
Times change, and if the change places new and important demands on water resources, the law controlling allocation of rights to
use water will change as well." In the humid eastern portion of the
United States, several recent changes have occurred that increase the
demand for the use of water and decrease the available supplies. In
some places it is simply a matter of water demand finally coming ab11. See generally, Robert Abrams, Replacing Riparianism in the Twenty-First
Century, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 93 (1990); T.E. Lauer, Reflections on Riparianism,35 Mo.
L. REV. 1 (1970).
12. See Robert H. Abrams, Chartingthe Course of Riparianism:An Instrumentalist Theory of Change,35 WAYNE L. REV. 1381 (1989).
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reast of, and passing available supply. Depending on the locale, the
demand escalator is likely to be increased population, sometimes
coupled with increased per capita water use. In some parts of the eastern United States, massive increases in water demand are the result of
vastly increased irrigation. Both of these phenomena are on display in
the heated controversy over the waters of the ApalachicolaChattahoochee-Flint (ACF) basin, which will be utilized as the principal example of contemporary Corps' operations and the potential
for conflict with state water allocation prerogatives."
In other locales, the total reliable supply is contracting. In coastal
regions, numerous supply reductions trace to the advent of saline intrusion that imperils groundwater supply. Saline intrusion occurs when
current pumping levels are drawing so much water from the aquifer
that the hydrostatic barrier that keeps saline water from mixing with
the fresh groundwater is weakened and can no longer maintain the
separation.'
Still more ominous constriction of supply in the East is associated
with global warming.15 The best climate models now uniformly predict
that many areas in the eastern United States will experience warmer,
wetter winters; hotter, drier summers; more extreme precipitation
events; and more drought events. 6 Those same predictions portend an
obvious spiking in the amount of summer water demand, primarily for
cooling and irrigation. In almost all eastern rivers, summer is the time
of lowest flows, which leads to greatest reliance on groundwater
sources and reservoir supplied water. On the ground, observable
changes in water supply consistent with these dire predictions are already occurring. Again, the ACF basin is a leading example.'7

13. See infra Part V.
14. See, e.g., BRITISH GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, UK GROUNDWATER FORUM, SEA
INTRUSION, http://www.groundwateruk.org/archive/sea-waterintrusion.pdf
(last visited Mar. 23, 2009). Increased saline intrusion also is potentially threatened by
rising ocean levels that may turn some aquifer recharge areas brackish, or accelerate
the mixing of adjacent salt water into the groundwater supply.
15. See Noah D. Hall, Bret B. Stuntz & Robert H. Abrams, Climate Change and
Freshwater Resources, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 30 (2008) and sources cited
therein.
16. See generally
PETER H. GLEICK ET AL., WATER: THE POTENTIAL
WATER

CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND CHANGE FOR THE WATER RESOURCES
OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE WATER SECTOR ASSESSMENT TEAM, UNITED
STATES

GLOBAL

CHANGE

RESEARCH

http://www.gcrio.org/NationalAssessment/water/water.pdf.
17. See infra Part V.

PROGRAM

(2000),
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Several climate change-induced phenomena pose a special challenge to water supply management. Under the old pre-climate change
norms, the variation in seasonal flow was within well-established historical limits. That pattern of the expected frequency and timing of
flows and droughts within predictable upper and lower limits is referred to as stationarity. Water managers relied on stationarity in
planning and designing their facilities and in making water allocation
decisions. So, for example, a planner would calculate the amount of
storage capacity needed for flood control and design the relevant
project with upper bounds of flows predicted assuming continued stationarity. Similarly, operating rules for the dams, such as when to spill
water to ensure adequate unfilled flood control capacity, or when to
fill the pool to ensure sufficient summer storage, also relied on continued stationarity. As the chance of more extreme rainfall events becomes a reality, however, flood control protection requires that more
water be spilled sooner as a hedge against the stormwater. On the flip
side of the same equation, the possibility of more intense drought and
warmer summers increase the need to hold more water in storage. If
the same dam is serving both purposes, the operational conflict is patent-the old operating pattern is being tugged in two opposite directions by the failure of the stationarity premise that was the fundamental planning and operating basis for the dam.
In short, with climate change, the historical patterns can no longer be relied upon."8 Water managers face a changed and more complex
reality. Not only is supply more erratic, the peak demand for water to
be supplied by the same facilities is greater, and the design of the facilities and past operational planning are likely to be out of synchronization with the timing of rainfall and drought events. The demise of stationarity opens the worst possibilities of all, a simultaneous increase of
demand in what are likely to be the periods of lowest supply, with a
concomitant threat of flooding due to more intense rainfall events,
which counsels against maintaining overly full reservoirs. 9
As the assumptions that water mangers used in building their systems begin to fail, the need for more responsive water allocation regimes is increasingly obvious. The states are becoming acutely aware
18. P. C. D. Milly, Julio Betancourt, Malin Falkenmark, Robert M. Hirsch, Zbigniew W. Kundzewicz, Dennis P. Lettenmaier & Ronald J. Stouffer, Stationarity is
Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 SCIENCE 573 (Feb. 1, 2008) available at
http://www.gfdl.noaa.gov/reference/bibliography/2008/pcmO8Ol.pdf.
19. Also escalating the threat of flooding is the continuing land use driven destruction of wetlands and encroachment on the flood plain that has accompanied the
rapid growth in the American southeast.
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of the control they require over the waters that sustain their citizens,
their ecologies, and their economies. The superimposed systemsstate water allocation and Corps projects-no longer co-exist as comfortably. States want to control allocation and the Corps' facilities can
be a major asset, if operated in accordance with the states' desires.
The Corps, however, operates the dams in accordance with its own
legal authorities, obligations, and attendant policies. The Corps' legal
structure, of course, is federal and has the force of the Supremacy
Clause' behind it. Adding to the dissonance, the water user stakeholders who see their interests imperiled are joining the fray and are
seeking to use any and all legal handles available to them to "force"
the states and the Corps to protect their interests. As in the ACF, the
competing uses can cross state lines and import an additional overlay
of legal doctrine that addresses interstate water disputes.
In this altered water supply and user-conflict reality, the Corps,
whether consciously or not, is performing a role in intrastate water
allocation policy that has traditionally resided with the states. When
interstate matters arise in addition to intrastate competition for the
available water, the Corps' actions begin to address issues that are
historically the province of the states, when they can agree through an
interstate compact (subject to Congressional approval21 ), and of Congress and the United States Supreme Court, when the states cannot
reach an agreement. Perspectives differ. Some would describe this
development as one in which the Corps is arrogating to itself powers
belonging the states or other branches. Some would describe the
Corps' actions as no more than necessary to operate the dams and
other projects under the legal mandate with which they are charged by
Congress. Without resolving that debate, the fact remains that the
Corps' physical position and operational control of its facilities puts
the Corps in the middle of the water allocation revolution in the eastern United States. The remainder of this article will examine some of
the issues surrounding that fact.
III. THE THREE ERAS OF AMERICAN "WATER FEDERALISM"

American water federalism is founded in part on a well-settled
principle of state hegemony over water allocation as an incident of
state sovereignty in defining property rights. Alternatively, a broader
ascription of state power over water allocation attaches as part of the
20. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, c. 3.
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traditional state police power authority to regulate natural resources
for the benefit of the people. This latter justification is amply supported in the nation's jurisprudence as it describes the states as the
inheritor from the English crown of the public trust responsibility over
navigable waters.' The idea that the states should be the authority
making allocative choices about water is deeply ingrained in doctrines
throughout water law, whether it be the federal Equal Footing Doctrine, or the courts of the western states announcing that their local
conditions require a water law different than that of England, the
eastern states, and even their own territorial law;" and that was eventually held to fully displace riparian rights in those states.'
Federal water-related interests were simultaneously recognized
and vindicated under the Supremacy Clause. The foremost of these
during the nation's earlier history was the federal role under the interstate and foreign commerce power26 to champion navigation. Even
state law property rights as fundamental as the riparian right of access
to the watercourse fell before the federal navigation servitude. Thus,
federal projects promoting the national interest in navigation extinguished vital incidents of state law property rights without Fifth
Amendment compensation. ' Somewhat less expansively, but also in
derogation of state water law, the Supreme Court recognized federal
reserved rights as attaching to portions of the then unappropriated
water found on public lands that were withdrawn from the public domain and reserved to a particular federal purpose.2 Thus, within its
sphere of enumerated powers, under the influence of the Supremacy
Clause, federal laws and initiatives displace in part the otherwise complete power of the states over water law. 9
22. Robert Haskell Abrams, Walking the Beach to the Core of Sovereignty: The
HistoricBasis for the Public Trust Doctrine Applied in Glass v. Goeckel, 40 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 861,884 (2007).
23. See, e.g., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
24. See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
25. Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935). The
displacement extends even to potential riparian rights claims of the United States on
retained federal lands of the public domain.
26. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
27. "Whatever rights may be as between equals such as riparian owners, they are
not the measure of riparian rights on a navigable stream relative to the function of the
Government in improving navigation." United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324
U.S. 499, 510 (1945).
28. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
29. An additional incursion on state power traceable to the Commerce Clause is
the authority of Congress and the Supreme Court to make allocation of "interstate"
waters. See generally, Sax, LCWR 4th 835-873.
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What emerged, at the beginning of the twentieth century, taking a
high level view of those arrangements, was a fairly coherent picture of
United States "water federalism." In the main, the states were the
source of water rights, but superior federal rights also existed, supporting specific federal interests, especially the interest in navigation. That
comfortable early 1900s picture of state-federal co-existence, when
navigation was the dominant federal water resource interest, 3° was
challenged by the advent of two major federal programmatic initiatives that more directly affected the use of the waters themselves: hydropower development and reclamation.
As written, the first two major federal water program-creating
statutes appeared to adhere fully to that simple view of American water federalism allowing the states full authority over water allocation.
The concept was incorporated in both the hydropower and reclamation fields, finding expression in section 27 of the Federal Power Act
which was enacted in 19203" and section 8 of the Reclamation Act of
1902.32 Those two statutory provisions share highly similar language,
with the provision in the Federal Power Act being a bit broader, explicitly addressing the whole spectrum of state water uses, rather than
focusing
on state irrigation laws as was done in the Reclamation Act
§8. 33
The interpretation of state-federal conflicts under those laws
sparked a far more discordant note that gave rise to the second era in
water federalism. Section 27 of the Federal Power Act, in relevant
part, reads as follows:
30. In that earlier age, the federal navigation interest was almost always confined
to areas where there was ample water available for all on-stream and off-stream uses.
A century ago, under the technologies of the time, it was virtually impossible to find a
case in which a state's interest in its own water law making allocations of the use of
the resource was in conflict with navigation. A century ago, the same was true even in

the arid West because navigation was only an option on major rivers that were not yet
being exhausted by irrigation drafts.
31. 16 U.S.C. § 821, 41 Stat. 1077 (1920).
32. 32 Stat. 390 (1902). See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
33. The more restrictive language of the Reclamation Act is as follows:
[N]othing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect
or in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to
the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation,
or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior,
in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with
such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of any State
or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user
of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or the waters thereof.
32 Stat. 390, now at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372,383 (2006).
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Nothing [in this statute] shall be construed as affecting or intending
to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of the respective
States relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of
water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any
vested right acquired therein. 34
Although that provision seems to ensure conformity to state water laws, it masks a much more subtle realm of potential conflict between effectuation of the federally authorized activity and state "control" of the water involved. The leading case is First Iowa HydroElectric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission.5 In First Iowa,
state law required a water use permit that could not be granted under
Iowa law unless the water impounded behind a dam was returned to
the original water course at the "nearest practicable place," a requirement that would not be met under the plan as authorized by the
Federal Power Commission." The Court found that section 27 established "a division of the common enterprise between two cooperating
agencies of Government, each with final authority within its own jurisdiction, 37 and gave more emphasis to the "division" than to the
"common enterprise" strand of analysis:
The securing of an Iowa state permit is not in any sense a condition
precedent or an administrative procedure that must be exhausted
before securing a federal license. It is a procedure required by the
State of Iowa in dealing with its local streams and also with the waters of the United States within that State in the absence of an assumption of jurisdiction by the United States over the navigability
of its waters. Now that the Federal Government has taken jurisdiction of such waters under the Federal Power Act, it has not by statute or regulation added the state requirements to its federal re18
quirements.

That same principle, making express provision for recognition of
existing state water rights, but none for recognition of concurrent state
regulation of the water itself, was extended to reclamation law by the
Court in a series of cases decided in the 1950s and 1960s.39 For exam34. 41 Stat. 1077 (1920) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 821 (2006)).
35. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
36. Id. at 166.
37. Id. at 167.
38. Id. at 170.
39. See Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958); City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
Ivanhoe summarized the key ruling regarding section 8, stating that, "it merely re-

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

pie, in Ivanhoe IrrigationDistrict v. McCracken,'o the Supreme Court
ruled that the 160-acre limitation on water deliveries of the federal
Reclamation Act was enforceable despite a California state law that
forbade the acreage limitation in the delivery of water." Similarly, in
City of Fresno v. California,"the Supreme Court expressly rejected an
argument that section 8 of the Reclamation Act "requires compliance
with California statutes relating to preferential rights of counties and
watersheds of origin and to the priority of domestic over irrigation
uses."43 The project water would be delivered according to federal law,

the state law of water allocation notwithstanding.
Applying the water federalism represented by the Supreme Court
decisions of the second era, it should be fairly plain that the old understanding was largely displaced and the federal program or project enjoys legal primacy over state law requirements other than previously
vested property rights.' In relation to the Corps' dams and projects,
the second era precedents would fully establish the Corps as the
preeminent water allocator to whatever extent that the congressional
authorization for either the general program under which the Corps is
acting or the specific project empowered the Corps to take actions
that had the effect of allocating the water to various users or in situ
uses. That result is not difficult to justify as a matter of legal doctrine.
If the application of state law would materially impede or frustrate the
federal program or project, state law must give way under the doctrine
of conflict preemption. 45
The third era in American water federalism was ushered in by
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in California v. United States,4
which is often referred to as the New Melones case because of the
name of the dam involved in the case. In New Melones, the Rehnquist
majority rather cavalierly reinvented the precedents of the second
era4 7 and limited them to cases of more or less express statutory
quires the United States to comply with state law when ... it becomes necessary for it
to acquire water rights or vested interests therein." 357 U.S. at 291-92.
40. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
41. See id. at 289-90.

42. 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
43. Id. at 630.
44. See, e.g., Douglas L. Grant, ESA Reductions In Reclamation Water Contract
Deliveries:A Fifth Amendment Taking Of Property?,36 ENVITL. L. 1331, 1343 (2006).
45. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1177 (3d ed.,
vol. 1 2000) (1978) (noting that "field" preemption may fall into any of the categories
of express, implied, or conflict preemption).
46. New Melones Dam, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
47. Justice White wrote, "The short of the matter is that no case in this Court,
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preemption.48 In so doing, the majority remanded a federal court decision that had exempted the United States from state-imposed conditions affecting dam operations and subsequent use of water that would
be impounded in conformity with California law. The Court to a significant degree reversed the polarity of the federalism primacy 49 by
instructing the federal district court to limit its review on remand to
"the United States' alternative contention that the conditions actually
imposed are inconsistent with congressional directives as to the New
Melones Dam."'
Stepping away from the debate in the Supreme Court about adherence to precedent, Justice Rehnquist's reshaping of American water federalism advanced a policy position that advocates state sovereignty in water resource allocation. The states are closer to the resource and more in touch with the water users and other stakeholders
more generally. To the extent there are thorny problems of allocation
bound up in dam operations, if these federal programs are to partake
of the cooperative federalism ushered in by the environmental law
revolution of that same era, the real allocational horse trading ought
to be done by the states, not the more remote federal bureaucracy."
As a matter of political theory, adherence to Rehnquist's interpretation of the Reclamation Act's section 8 in New Melones is an instruction that the only time when the federal government will dictate the
ultimate water resource allocation will be when there is a clear congressional command. The federal government will not allocate the
resource when there is merely a delegation to an agency as part of
general programmatic legislation.

until this one, has construed § 8 [of the Reclamation Act] as the present majority insists that it be construed. All of the relevant cases are to the contrary." 438 U.S. at
692 (White, J., dissenting). See also, Amy Kelley, Staging a Comeback-Section 8 of
the Reclamation Act, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 97 (1984).
48. New Melones Dam, 438 U.S. at 690.

49. In regard to hydropower, federal prerogatives, even those adversely affecting
state environmental water management, appear to remain preemptive. See California
v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n (Rock Creek), 495 U.S. 490 (1990).
50. 438 U.S. at 679.
51. The real "horse trading" is, for example, allocating air emissions among stationary sources under the Clean Air Act State Implementation Plan process. 42
U.S.C. § 7410 (2006). This is a matter for state regulators, not the federal government.
See Union Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) (economic feasibility
and stringency of permit conditions for state agency). See generally ZYGMUNT
PLATER, ROBERT ABRAMS, WILLIAM GOLDFARB, ROBERT GRAHAM, LISA
HEINZERLING & DAVID WIRTH, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW
AND SOCIETY 578-93 (3d ed. 2004).
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IV. THE CORPS AND ITS OPERATIONS IN THE THIRD ERA OF WATER
FEDERALISM

Lest anyone underestimate the growing water footprint of the
Corps, the Corps is now the most significant player in United States
water management. The process began gradually, with the Corps expanding beyond its traditional ports and waterways/navigation role in
the twentieth century. According to its own history, the Corps began
its involvement in dam building for hydropower as part of the New
Roughly contemporaneously, the Corps began to build
Deal."
projects to prevent or minimize flood damage. With the enactment of
the Flood Control Act of 1944,53 sometimes referred to as the PickSloan Plan, Congress enlarged the scope of uses that the Corps could
pursue in a single project by authorizing planning and eventual construction of huge multi-purpose projects in the Missouri Valley that
simultaneously would provide flood control, irrigation, navigation,
water supply, hydropower, and recreation.' With the federal reclamation project building era well in the past, the Corps has even expanded
into water supply and irrigation projects west of the 100th meridian.5
The scope of the expansion of Corps' projects and their diversity
is quite considerable. In addition to its many flood control efforts, the
enumerated activities of the Corps include 75 hydropower facilities
that generate one quarter of all hydropower in the United States (3%
of all electric generation), 235 locks that create 12,000 miles of inland
waterways, and the Corps' 463 projects provide water recreation at
almost 5,000 separate sites (some of the sites are operated by state and
local governments) that support an estimated 360 million annual visits
by 25 million different users each year. Corps dams have a storage
capacity of 329.9 million acre feet of water (MAF). Those reservoirs
supply municipal water to nearly 10 million people in 115 cities. Of
the total storage, 55.9 MAF is allocated to irrigation storage, all of
which is located in the 17 western and plains states. 6

52. United States Army Corps of Engineers, Brief History, available at
http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/History/brief.htm. [hereinafter Corps Brief History].
53. Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887 (1944).
54. CorpsBrief History, supra note 52.

55. See infra text accompanying note 56.
56. UNITED
RESOURCES,

STATES

ARMY CORPS
WATER

OF

ENGINEERS,
SUPPLY

INSTITUTE

OF WATER
DATABASE

http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/inside/products/pub/iwrreports/lWRReport05-PS1.pdf.
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There is no one way in which Congress authorizes Corps projects.
One common pattern begins when Congress enacts a major bill that
establishes authority for an entire Corps program, such as the previously mentioned Flood Control Act of 1944 that created the legal
framework for Pick-Sloan Plan projects. Regional Corps offices in the
relevant locales thereafter design and propose projects under the umbrella created by the programmatic legislation and submit those
projects for specific congressional authorization and funding. Projects
also can well up from inside of the Corps or at the behest of local interests, who usually ask local representatives in Congress to request
that the Corps study the feasibility of particular projects and report on
that to the congressional committees on Public Works.57 In the end,
each project is authorized by Congress with a specific set of purposes,58
usually as part of a larger annual bill that encompasses multiple Corps'
and other agency public works requests. 9
The project authorization process, not surprisingly, mixes parts of
rational planning, bureaucratic self-interest of a construction-oriented
agency, and political considerations. Together, those elements combine to generate a legislative enactment that enunciates the specific
purposes of the project. 6° The omnibus construction bills that mark the
end of the process are viewed widely as pork barrel legislation. Critics
repeatedly assail the benefit-cost comparisons the Corps puts forth in
justification of the projects as grossly inflated. Similarly, the Corps is
not considered to be an objective or disinterested participant in the
process. The Corps is a project promoter in the process that measures
57. This process was followed in relation to the West Point Dam and Lake, a part
of the ACF series of Corps' facilities discussed infra at Part V. See George W. Sherk,
The Management of Interstate Water Conflicts in the Twenty-First Century: Is It Time
To Call Uncle?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVT'L L.J. 764, 782- 84 (2005).
58. For example, all of the Corps facilities in the ACF Basin have specific authorizations, see George W. Sherk, The Corps' Conundrum: Reconciling Conflicting Statutory Requirements in the A CF River Basin, Proceedings of the 2005 Georgia Water
Resources Conference at the University of Georgia, Athens, Ga. (Apr. 25-27, 2005),
at
available
http://www.uga.edu/water/GWRC/Papers/SherkJ%20Corps%20Conundrum.pdf.
59. For example, the Buford Dam that forms Lake Lanier near Atlanta, GA on
the Chattahoochee River was initially authorized as part of the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 17, and that authorization was subsequently amended by the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 635. The latter authorization specifically
referenced a Report of General Wheeler of the Corps in relation to the dam's authorized purposes.
60. For an extensive exposition on Corps water project decision making, see A.
Dan Tarlock, A First Look at a Modem Legal Regime for a "Post-Modem" United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1285, 1299-1307 (2004).
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its success, at least in part, by getting as many projects funded as possible.6 Other than in its own public relations materials, the Corps does
not enjoy a reputation as a careful steward of the nation's water resources.
The overriding point, here, however, is not the Corps' role in the
authorization process, but that Congress, in the end, speaks directly
regarding project purposes. This aspect of congressional project approval has two significant consequences: (1) it reduces the Corps' discretion to manage projects adaptively if doing so is at variance with
the original congressional direction, and (2) it strengthens the argument that the federal legislative pronouncement should preempt state
law and policy in regard to water allocation of properly acquired
project waters. Those two divergent impacts on Corps' authority may
result in the worst of both worlds - reduced flexibility in meeting
changed water supply and demand conditions, and greater insulation
from state and stakeholder control reflective of state laws or state law
entitlements.
V. THE APALACHICOLA-CHATFAHOOCHEE-FLINT BASIN AS A
CONTEMPORARY CASE STUDY

There are numerous articles addressing virtually every aspect of
the continuing ACF water controversy.62 For that reason, the discus61. See generally

KATE COSTENBADER,

NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION

STEVE

& TAXPAYERS
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&
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CONRAD,

FOR COMMON SENSE, CROSSROADS:

CONGRESS, THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA'S WATER
RESOURCES (2004) available at http://www.nwf.org/wildlife/pdfs/Crossroads.pdf.

62. The following is a partiallist of ACF articles: Robert Haskell Abrams, Interstate Water Allocation: A Contemporary Primerfor Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 155 (2002); Jessica A. Bielecki, Managing Resources with Interstate
Compacts: A Perspective from the Great Lake, 14 BuFF. ENVTL. L.J. 173 (2007); Josh
Clemons, Interstate Water Disputes: A Roadmap for the States, 12 S.E. ENVTL. L.J. 115
(2004); Carl Erhardt, The Battle Over "The Hooch": The Federal-Interstate Water
Compact and the Resolution of Rights in the ChatahoocheeRiver, 11 STAN. ENVTL.L.J.

200 (1992); Robert P. Fowler, Jeffrey H. Wood & Thomas L. Casey, III, Maintaining
the Navigability of America's Inland Waterways, 21 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 16
(2006); Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Allocation of Rivers Before the United States Supreme Court: The Apalachicola-Chatahoochee-FlintRiver System, 21 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 401 (2004); Arnall Golden Gregory, LLP, Eleventh Circuit Allows Settlement on
Lake LanierBetween CorpsAtlanta Area Governments, 17 No.4 ENVTL. L. LETTER 3
(2005); C. Grady Moore, Water Wars: Interstate Water Allocation in the Southeast, 14
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 5 (1999); J.B. Ruhl, Equitable Apportionment of Ecosystem
Services: New Water Law for a New Water Age, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVT'L 47 (2003);
J.B. Ruhl, Water Wars, Eastern Style: Divvying Up the Apalachicola-ChatahoocheeFlint River Basin, 131 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 47 (2005); Dustin S. Ste-
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sion here will be limited to a brief description of prominent basin features and only a summary of the most recent events on the ground and
in court. The focus here will be on the implications of this article's discussion of water federalism on the likely course of near term ACF
events.

phenson, The Tri-State Compact: FallingWaters and Fading Opportunities,16 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 83 (2000); Jeffrey Uhlman Beaverstock, Comment, Learning to Get
Along: Alabama, Georgia, Floridaand ChattahoocheeRiver Compact, 49 ALA. L REV.
993 (1998); Drew Melville, Whiskey is for Drinking: Recent Water Law Developments
in Florida,20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 489 (2005); Natasha Meruelo, Note, Considering a Cooperative Water Management Approach in Resolving the ApalachicolaChattahoochee-FlintBasin Water War, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 335 (2007); C.
Hansell Watt, IV, Comment, Who Gets the Hooch?: Georgia, Florida, and Alabama
Battle for Water from the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-FlintRiver Basin, 55 MERCER
L. REV. 1453 (2004).

UALR LAW REVIEW

Map of the ACF Basin
Source: United States Geological Service
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/nawqa/graphics/map.basin.gif

[Vol. 31

2009]

WATER FEDERALISM

NORTH CAROUNA

ALABAMA

Il

GEORGA

SOTH CAROUNA

Buford Dam

Da

"o

BafltbF~•a
Ehat errDm

co,ns&l

an F as Dun

o'Atlant a

C*MfYb.
i

CorpsDams
=eNon-Cop

West Poin D

__

Walter F. George D'

(

N,
D oth an

Danis

AZ

Chip County Dam
any Dam

bany

"XDa
'or

uuzrewsDa

. im
LFI
OR IDA
Woodruff Dam

Pan am a City

Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin
Dams of the ACF Basin
Source: United States Army Corps of Engineers
http://water.sam.usace.army.mil/acfmap.htm

On the ground, the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers rise in north
and central Georgia respectively. The Chattahoochee flows westerly
before turning to an almost due south course, forming part of the border of Georgia and Alabama. The two rivers join at the Florida border
and form the Apalachicola River, which then flows through the Flori-
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da panhandle into the Gulf of Mexico. The Atlanta metropolitan area
lies in part in the upper Chattahoochee basin. Lake Lanier, formed by
the Corps, and constructed and operated by Buford Dam, is now the
principal source of water storage and supply for the millions of people
in the metro area. Atlanta has no significant groundwater or other
surface water supply.63

Further down the Chattahoochee are four more Corps operated
dams, mostly providing vast opportunities for flat-water recreation,
but also supporting some hydropower and, in the lower part of the
basin, navigation that supports farm product and industrial shipping.
Most of the industry is on the Alabama side of the river, and a major
nuclear power facility that draws cooling water from the river is located there. The Flint Basin is entirely within Georgia and is dominated by agriculture and some forestry. There are no major dams on
the Flint. Portions of the Flint Basin are underlain by the very productive Floridian Aquifer, and drafts on the aquifer deplete the base flow
of the Flint. Finally, the Apalachicola, which is roughly fifty miles in
length and runs through a rural region, supports tourism and provides
the ecologically vital fresh water flows into the highly productive Apalachicola Bay, which is famous for its oysters.
As an oversimplified view of supply and demand, the Atlanta region users near the top of the basin want to retain water in Lake Lanier for municipal supply as the region is enduring record droughts. The
Alabama users want water released from Lake Lanier through the
Buford Dam to ensure flat-water recreation, cooling water availability
and navigation in the middle and lower sections of the Chattahoochee.
The hydropower interests favor those releases as well, but they are
willing to accept reduced Lake Lanier releases through the turbines in
exchange for what amount to monetary benefits.' The Flint farmers
want to be allowed to continue to increase irrigation in the pursuit of
crop production that is made lucrative by federal commodity price
stabilization programs. The Floridians at the bottom of the system
want water released upstream to ensure adequate ecological flows to
support the Bay's ecology and the tourism that the bay and the Apalachicola River attract. Finally, there are required environmental flows
associated with non-economic interests.
63. City of Atlanta Planning and Community Development website, "Hydrology
at
available
Watersheds,"
and
http://apps.atlantaga.gov/citydir/dpcd/cdp/section_1121291920390.html.
64. Water released from Lake Lanier to supply Atlanta does not return to Lake
Lanier. Atlanta's wastewater system does return a portion of its discharge to the
Chattahoochee.
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The ACF is home to listed endangered species, fresh water mussels that are killed when parts of the riverbed become exposed due to
low flow, and sturgeon that need higher flows at particular times to
permit spawning and the development and movement of juveniles.
The extended drought in the upper Chattahoochee has brought the
user conflicts under short supply into high relief. The Corps, although
it claims only to be operating the dams in conformity with its many
legal obligations and authorities, has tried to allocate as much water as
possible to Atlanta, and those efforts have become the flashpoint for
extended litigation among the three states and also among other water-using stakeholders in the basin.65
With the focus here on the Corps and its role in managing the water, one thing stands out almost immediately-the Corps is the entity
with the greatest physical control in the basin. Thus, at least as long
as the ongoing interstate wrangling among the basin states persists,
and possibly thereafter, 66 the real world results are being dictated by
the Corps as a function of its dam operations. Correspondingly, the
most effective method of altering present water allocation decisions is
to influence the Corps, whether through negotiation or litigation.
"[T]he goal.., is to affect the Corps' operation of its controlling dams
on the Chattahoochee in a manner that
results in a favorable outcome
67
for the party seeking that influence.,
The five Corps' dams on the Chattahoochee,' as indicated previously, each have a specific set of congressionally authorized purposes.

65. See infra text accompanying notes 80-82.
66. There is no assurance that a judicially imposed interstate equitable apportionment, for example, would reduce the role of the Corps. A resolution that involved
Congress is more likely, but not certain, to address some of the potential friction between the Corps' missions and states and water-user interests. See infra Part VI.
67. Robert Abrams, Settlement of the ACF Controversy: Sisyphus at the Dawn of
the 21st Century, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 681, 682 (2008)(footnotes omitted).
68. These dams are, from north to south, Buford, West Point, George, Andrews,
and Woodruff. A very simple schematic is provided by the Corps at
http://water.sam.usace.army.mil/acfframe.htm. The Morgan Falls Dam below Buford
is a private dam built for hydropower generation.
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Corps Dams on the Chattahoochee69

Dam

Buford

Initial Authorization Date
1945,
amended 1946

West Point

1962

George

1945

Andrews
Woodruff

1946
1945,

Purposes

Flood control, hydropower,
and secondarily to assist
downstream navigation"
Hydropower, flood control,
fish and wildlife recreation,
general recreation, and navigation
Flood control, navigation and
hydropower
Navigation
Navigation and hydropower

amended 1946

In addition to the explicitly authorized purposes, the Corps oper-

ates its facilities under the authority of other Corps-specific and more
general laws. In the Water Supply Act of 1958,"' Congress allowed
incidental use of unallocated storage in Corps' dams for municipal
69. Information on the dams is taken from George W. Sherk, The Management of
Interstate Water conflicts in the Twenty First Century: Is it Time to Call Uncle? 12
N.Y.U. ENVT'L L.J. 764, 781-86 (2005) [hereinafter Sherk] and the sources cited there.
70. The Corps disputes this limited list of purposes and claims that Congress also
authorized secondary purposes of water supply and water quality, navigation,
recreation, and fish and wildlife management. See Sherk, supra note 69, at 771.
71. 43 U.S.C. § 390b (1986).

20091

WATER FEDERALISM

water supply. In more general terms, the Corps is subject to laws that
affect all federal agencies, most pointedly, the National Environmental Policy Act72 ("NEPA") and the Endangered Species Act73
("ESA").
Turning now to the management of the waters of the ACF basin,
the states have not reached any direct agreement that either allocates
the water between them or establishes a management regime for the
basin. Importantly, had they done so by interstate compact, congressional ratification would have been required and could have been
used as a lever to ensure that the compact addresses the Corps' role
and the extent to which Corps' facilities are to be operated in subservience to the compact. In the absence of such a federalized interstate
agreement, the Corps is left with the unenviable position of being the
de facto water manager in much of the basin because its dams control
the timing and amount of water that will be available in Lake Lanier
and in the various stream stretches of the Chattahoochee and Apalachicola Rivers; those flows function as a limit on how much water can
be devoted to the competing uses.
The Corps, in this aspect of its operations, is very much like any
other executive branch agency.74 Agencies, as the name suggests, are
agents who fulfill the instructions of a principal, in this case, Congress.
Unless the authorizing legislation provides otherwise (and it does not),
the first obligation of the Corps in the operation of the facilities must
be to the authorized purposes.
This bedrock legal obligation is potentially anachronistic. If, as
Professor Sherk argues, the authorized purposes of Buford Dam are
only flood control and navigation, and secondarily release of water to
assist downstream navigation, providing water to supply the Atlanta
metro region is ultra vires. Taking the Water Supply Act of 1958 into
account, the Corps is authorized to devote otherwise unallocated storage to municipal supply in conformity with the state and local laws.
The allocation of storage water to municipal supply is subject to an
express limitation:
Modifications of a reservoir project heretofore authorized, surveyed, planned, or constructed to include storage as provided in
subsection (b) of this section which would seriously affect the pur72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1986).
73. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. (1986).
74. In some of its military-support functions, the ultimate authority arguably may
be the executive, but that is inapposite to dam operations affecting water allocation
and use.
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poses for which the project was authorized, surveyed, planned, or
constructed, or which would involve major structural or operational changes shall be made only upon the approval of Congress as
now provided by law.75
For a moment, consider the ACF dispute in a light that casts a
cloak of reasonableness on what the Corps attempted to do. Atlanta is
a rapidly growing metropolitan region with very few water supply options. It is located at the upper end of two watersheds, the Chattahoochee and the Ocmulgee, and due to its position on the Atlanta Plateau
of the Greater Georgia Piedmont region, there are few reservoir sites.
Even if there were still undeveloped sites, all of the water that those
reservoirs are likely to capture and store is already being stored in
Lake Lanier. The United States Geologic Survey describes Atlanta's
water situation as follows:
Atlanta grew at the intersection of several ridges on the drainage
divide between the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. Consequently, most streams in the Atlanta area are small and many are
severely affected by prolonged droughts. The only sizable stream
which flows through the metropolitan area is the Chattahoochee
River, the headwaters of which are in the mountains of north
Georgia. The Chattahoochee River is of marginal size to supply a
metropolitan area the size of Atlanta's, and ground-water resources in the area are comparatively limited.76
Two Corps' reservoirs are relatively close at hand, Lake Lanier
and Lake Allatoona-in the neighboring Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa
Basin that is farther to the west and for which reservoir operations are
also controversial." As Atlanta grew, the Corps began to allocate
stored water to municipal supply on an interim basis beginning in the
1970s. 8 Although the Atlanta area was drought prone, as a historic
matter the ACF basin overall was less so and there were not severe
shortages downstream at the time Atlanta's interim storage allocations
75. 43 U.S.C. § 390b(d) (1986). The statute was originally enacted in 1958 at Pub.
L. No. 85-500, Title III, § 301, July 3, 1958, 72 Stat. 319.
76. USGS, Atlanta Area Water Supply and Use, available at
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/olympics/atlanta.wu.html.
77. See, e.g., Benjamin L. Snowden, Note, Bargainingin the Shadow of Uncertainty: Understandingthe Failureof the ACF and ACT Compacts, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.

134, 138-41 (2005).
78. The history of the water use developments and the litigation described in this
portion of the text are recounted in Alabama v. Army Corps of Engineers, 424 F.3r
1117, 1122-27 (11th Cir. 2005). See also, Georgia v. Army Corps of Engineers, 302
F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2002).
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began. The lack of conflict plausibly explains why there was little reaction to the Corps' initial water supply use of "unallocated storage"
under the Water Supply Act of 1958.
Atlanta continued to grow, and the growth accelerated greatly in
the 1980s and 1990s. The only viable source of additional water was
increased amounts of water supplied by the Corps. Alabama and
Florida, the downstream states, feared that the Corps' ACF operations would harm their sovereign interests in the waters of the basin
and initiated litigation challenging the Corps' efforts to increase the
amount of water going to Atlanta. Georgia intervened to defend and
also brought its own lawsuit against the Corps that sought to perpetuate the larger amounts of storage dedicated to municipal supply.
Those lawsuits were stayed for roughly a decade, as the three states
agreed to negotiate a settlement that would allocate the waters of the
basin. The states went so far as to enter into an interstate compact in
which they agreed on a process that was intended to reach an agreed
allocation.79
Although the tri-state negotiations dragged on and ultimately
failed, the effects of the Corps' allocation of increased storage space to
municipal supply had a more focused and immediate impact on the
amount of hydropower generated at Buford Dam, one of the two specifically enumerated purposes of the project. The larger municipal
supply use changed the timing of Lake Lanier releases and most of the
city's water bypassed the turbines by being withdrawn directly from
Lake Lanier rather than from an intake on the Chattahoochee below
the dam. The hydropower interests, spearheaded by the Southeastern
Federal Power Consumers ("SeFPC"), sued the Corps in the District
of Columbia to obtain greater releases of water through the turbines
pursuant to their contract with the Corps.
Ultimately, SeFPC was willing to accept a settlement and consent
decree granting them monetary relief instead of forcing the water to
be used for hydropower generation.8 Alabama and Florida, which had
intervened, viewed that settlement as a defeat for them and as a de
facto approval of the Corps' allocation of additional water to Atlanta.
They objected to the settlement and appealed the eventual consent
judgment. Leaving no lawsuit unattended, the downstream states also
renewed proceedings in the long-stayed cases against the Corps and
79. Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, art. I, Pub. L. No.
105-104, 111 Stat. 2219, 2219 (1997); Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin Compact, art. I, Pub. L. No. 105-105, 111 Stat. 2233, 2233 (1997).
80. See Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Caldera, 301 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C.

2004).
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even brought a collateral attack on the D.C. proceedings claiming that
the Corps had violated the terms of the stay in the 1990s Alabama
lawsuit by entering into its agreement in the SeFPC suit. Although the
downstream states did not prevail, they were allowed to file an
amended complaint which permitted them to renew and sharpen
claims against the Corps under NEPA and ESA, and launch a claim
under the Water Supply Act of 1958 ("WSA").
Outside of the courtrooms, regional drought meant that the
Corps' dam operations exerted important control over the timing and
amount of flows. The changed flow regime exacerbated the user conflicts by at times reducing channel depth for navigation, threatening
shutdown of the nuclear power plant for lack of cooling water, dropping levels on recreational lakes, and reducing flow to Apalachicola
Bay which increased its salinity. The Corps' imposed flow regime,
along with the drought, also posed threats to listed endangered mussel
and sturgeon species."' And while these real world effects were what
was motivating the stakeholders to act, the focus of their lawsuits was
not on achieving a good overall result for the basin, it was narrowly
directed at trying to force the Corps into one management and water
allocation posture or another. Although each of the litigants might
claim to be the true champion of the best interests of the basin, all are
seeking to force a pattern of Corps' dam operations that effectively
displace and discount the importance of other water uses in the basin.
At the end of the day, the argument is about what inflexible legislative
mandate the Corps must obey and a more-or-less wooden water allocation that will follow. That may be a proper litigation posture, but it
demonstrates just how unlikely the present system is to reach a Solomonic solution.
As 2008 came to a close, the downstream states enjoyed the taste
of the latest legal victory, because the Corps' reallocation of additional
water to Atlanta, even during a drought of record was ruled to be not
legally permissible.82 Although there may be many reasons to doubt
that Atlanta has done all it can to conserve its water, the decision did
not rest on the bona fides of Atlanta's water needs, nor did it even rest
on arguments about Endangered Species flow, or if the Corps' current
operations are causing irreparable harm to other uses in the basin that
81. The ESA threats to the species caused Florida to bring motions for immediate
injunctions in the pending Alabama lawsuit. These efforts were, in the main, unsuccessful. Eventually the remaining Alabama and Georgia litigation was consolidated
into multidistrict litigation that is being heard in Jacksonville, Florida by United States
District Court Judge Magnuson, whose home venue is Minnesota.
82. See Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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would exceed the harm to Atlanta if its share of Lake Lanier-stored
Chattahoochee water was reduced. Rather, the court decision rested
solely on the previously reproduced limitation Corps' authority passed
fifty years ago as part of a law that, ironically, was intended to permit
the Corps' somewhat greater flexibility in operating its dams. The current system of trying to "force" the Corps' hand is an affront to informed water allocation and management. It also is anathema to the
underlying principle of state control of water use.
VI. THE ACF EXPERIENCE AND WATER FEDERALISM
The myriad of ACF litigation portends a major step back into the
second era of water federalism. When a Corps project is in control of
the water, just as much as when a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") licensed dam is operating, state water allocation
law recedes into the background. There is only argument about what
the federal law requires the Corps to do, not consideration of the state
water allocation policies and interests. Tacitly, the parties, and explicitly the court, are saying that the allocation must follow the path
drawn by Congress for the Corps in statutes and project authorizations
passed a half century ago. In this case, as far as the court of appeals
was concerned, the only relevant question had nothing to do with the
water; Congress set the parameters: "Section 301 of the WSA plainly
states that a major operational change to a project falling within its
scope requires prior Congressional approval."83 This change was major, and therefore, ultra vires. 4
This federalist position not only prevents the Corps from responding to a water reality that was unforeseen when those laws were
enacted, it also gives no recognition to the states' sovereign interests.
Perhaps worse, the decision being made is totally out of touch with the
real problem facing the ACF, a problem that, in part, is increased demand, but is also the more endemic problem of loss of stationarity that
is associated with climate change. The elimination of responsive options that could be pursued by the Corps is all the more troubling
since the Corps currently is the only entity" possessed of the physical
83. Id. at 1323.
84. Id. at 1324.
85. Other entities do, in fact, have power to act in meaningful ways, although
none as dramatically as the Corps. Conservation efforts in the Atlanta region have
ranged from modest to laughable, and the Georgia Department of Environmental
Conservation has blithely permitted excessive Flint River irrigation to deplete the
summer flows into the Apalachicola from that source. See, Robert Abrams, Broaden-
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or regulatory capacity to respond to the crisis, whether the proper response entails providing water for Atlanta's municipal supply, or water for navigation and nuclear power plant cooling in the middle
reaches of the basin, or water for ecologically vital flows in the lower
basin and Apalachicola Bay. What also is precluded is a method by
which the Corps can become a facilitator whose operations provide
water to support a carefully calibrated mix of uses that is arrived at by
a rational process that accounts for the comparative benefits and costs
of the choices being made and foregone. Giving greater, less fettered
power to the Corps is not an appealing solution. Doing anything to
increase the power of the Corps beyond its narrow, congressionallycircumscribed project and more general statutory authorities stands
water federalism on its head. States would lose their traditional police
power role entirely. None seem ready or willing to appoint the Corps
as Platonic Guardians of the nation's water resources, and many
would be aghast at the prospect.
More optimistically, a changed approach to the ACF could serve
as a bridge to a modern era of water federalism. The abject failure of
the states of Georgia, Alabama, and Florida to reach a consensus on
allocating the water of the basin is a major obstacle in resolving the
ACF controversy on a lasting basis. Simultaneously, in the absence of
interstate agreement, none of the basin states are in a position to confidently adopt a state water policy to be respected and fostered by
federal agencies in the operation of their physical facilities. The states
cannot be faulted for not trying to reach an agreement, that they have
done. But the states can be faulted for the type of agreement they
have been seeking. Their goal was a quantified division of the water,
with each state in control of its allocated share. 6 The model for such
agreements was the typical western states water compact, where in
many places the uses across the state lines were similar and dominated
by irrigation and much of the water was consumed by the use. 7
In the ACF, however, it is patently clear that the uses of basin water are much more varied than the typical rural western setting, and
the upstream and downstream uses are physically interrelated by the
ing Narrow Perspectives and Nuisance Law: Protecting Ecosystem Services in the ACF
Basin, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 243,255-62 (2007).
86. Robert Abrams, Secure Water Rights in Interstate Waters, WATER LAW:
TRENDS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE, 330, 331-334 (Kathleen Marion Carr & James D.
Crammond, eds. 1995); see also, Robert Abrams, Interstate Water Allocation: A Contemporary Primerfor Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 155, 169-70

(2002).
87. See, e.g., Pecos River Compact, 63 Stat. 159 (1949)
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movement and timing of flows through the ranges of the basin. The
best result for the basin is to optimize the system to maximize the
benefits across all of the uses. Particularly with the loss of stationarity,
which makes quantified allocations almost impossible to negotiate
because of the unreliability of annual flows, the search should be for
agreement on management principles rather than on quantified water
allocation.'
There are at least two models other than the western water compacts that the ACF might emulate. The first and most successful to
date is the type of integrated basin management practiced by the Delaware River Basin Commission under authority granted to it by the
Delaware River Compact.' The management perspective of the Delaware River Basin Commission is the entire basin, rather than its individual states. The second is exemplified by the "horizontal federalism" that is at the core of the recently enacted Great Lakes Compact,'
which has been approved by all of the basin states and ratified by
Congress. Under that system, the basin states compact to manage the
resource according to a common set of standards that are then implemented by each of the basin states within their respective boundaries.91
As a third alternative approach, the ACF basin states ought to reconsider the process by which they seek agreement. The ACF is not
the first basin to experience complex, interconnected water allocation
issues. In the West, particularly in the context of inter-sovereign disputes that include tribal water claims, but also in mediating allocation
contexts in basins where environmental flows place added demands on
the system, there are now decades of experience in seeking negotiated
settlements. There, as a matter of process, the greatest level of success
is being obtained by an inclusive process in which the water users, the
so-called "stakeholders," participate.

88. For a perspective that criticizes the absence of an ecologically based, unified
water management system, see Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change, Regulatory
Fragmentation,and Water Triage, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 825 (2008).
89. Delaware River Compact, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
For similar management
aspects, see the Susquehanna River Compact, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970). See also Douglas
L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of Permanence
Becomes the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 105 (2003).
90. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L.
No. 110-342, 122 Stat 3739 (Oct. 3, 2008).
91. For the framework principles of that agreement and their federalism aspects,
see Noah D. Hall, Toward a New HorizontalFederalism:Interstate Water Management
in the GreatLakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 405 (2006).
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Unlike the political demagoguery that has characterized the state
positions in the ACF controversy,' a bottom-up process has a different dynamic and greater potential for compromise. Involving the
stakeholders allows them to clearly identify their water needs, their
tolerance for alternatives that are feasible as to modes of use, and
promotes shared understanding of the needs of others in the basin.
That same sort of exposition, because it opens the claims of need to
review by others, tends to expose what positions are inflated or unnecessarily inflexible. When those sorts of discussions can be backed by
a very accurate basin hydrologic model, the conditions become more
favorable for reaching a consensus on how the water of the basin
should be managed up and down the rivers. The interests are all on
the table-municipal water supply, ecological integrity, hydropower,
navigation, cooling, recreation, irrigation, and whatever else the basin
supports with its water. An agreed model of the basin makes the
trade-offs of different management options plain for all to see. That
improved knowledge and better understanding of consequences frequently allows a prioritization among the water uses and alternative
solutions that ameliorate the injury to others whose uses are curtailed.
With a move to any of those new management strategies, a new
water federalism is possible in which the Corps is a facilitator, operating its facilities in furtherance of the basin management plan. Congress, of course, must agree to this via legislation, but when the basin
states are able to agree, Congress is usually quick to give its support.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Eastern states, no less than the Western states, believe that
critical decisions about the allocation of vitally important state re92. For example, U.S. Rep. John Linder, R-Georgia is quoted as saying, "What
we've learned from this is what a blunt weapon the Endangered Species Act has become, where some obscure bureaucrat in Fish and Wildlife and some obscure judge
can decide that mussels are more important than our children and grandchildren."
Karen Chenoweth, Georgia Gov. Sonny PerdueDeclares State of Emergency, Oct. 20,
2007,
available
at
http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/usa/news/article-1367l25.php/Georgia-Gov.
_SonnyPerdue declaresstate oftemergency. Governor Sonny Perdue of Georgia
had made similar comments and also criticized Florida's position, saying, "Utilizing
the Endangered Species Act as a weapon in this battle is somewhat disingenuous. We
know what this is about, we know it's about the bay and the quality of the bay and the
oysters and that very powerful, very loud political constituency. Let's don't try to
make it about a federal law that really it's not all about, about mussels or about
sturgeons." Associated Press, Gov. Sunny Perdue Questions Fla. Argument in Water
Wars, Nov. 12, 2008, availableat http://www.accessnorthga.com/detail.php?n=215180.
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sources, especially water, are a matter to be decided by the state exercising its police power. The states do not gladly cede those decisions to
the Army Corps of Engineers as an included by-product of Corps'
project operations. To state the matter that way highlights the two
most patent drawbacks of current Corps operations that are affecting
water allocation outcomes in the East. The states are being stripped of
what is their due under both traditional police power authority and
under the prevailing historic and more recent view of the proper allocation of roles in American water federalism. Simultaneously, the
Corps' allocation decisions are being made, not on the merits of the
allocation, but as a consequence of dated project authorizations or
general statutes that do not consider the trade-offs that inhere in water allocation decisions made under conditions of water scarcity.
The more conventional options usually thought of as available to
redress the problem of outmoded authorizations are not particularly
appealing. Even if the Corps was given a freer hand in water allocation matters, that does not begin to address the misallocation of decisional authority as a federalism matter, and it does not address the
lack of qualification of the Corps, as it presently functions, to be the
arbiter of this issue. As an historic matter, putting the Corps in charge
of major water management decisions and leaving the Corps to its
own devices does not inspire great confidence.93 Even in its more
mundane functioning, the Corps has lost credibility as an unbiased,
scientifically sound project proponent. Its unrelenting advocacy for
marginal pork barrel projects seems to be more in the Corps' interest
than in the public interest. The Corps has lost public confidence as a
judicious broker of competing interests, especially more subtle environmental and ecological concerns.
Still, the Corps or some other governmental agency is going to
have to remain an invaluable part of any water management regime.
Someone possessed of the power of eminent domain must build and
operate the dams and other projects. Because of the potential effect
on navigation, that entity must be federal in origin, or an interstate
compact commission whose powers are ratified by Congress. The
Corps is at least as well suited to that task as any new entity that might
93. Even beyond the disastrous consequences of Corps actions in the Everglades
and the catastrophically misguided design of the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Channel and levee-induced wetlands destruction in that region, there are numerous instances in which Corps' projects continue to have significant negative consequences.
For a catalogue of such criticisms, see Kate Costenbader, Steve Ellis & David Conrad,
Crossroads: Congress, the Corps of Engineers and the Future of America's Water Resources (2004), availableat http://www.nwf.org/wildlife/pdfs/Crossroads.pdf.
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be created-the real question will be how the operating plans are
drawn and modified. That role has been left to the Corps in the past
and, at present, there is nothing in the Corps' history or current legislation that provides reliable guidance or a framework on which holistic
water allocation decisions can be reached.
Creating a new and responsive mechanism for making the water
allocation decisions-the hard choices among competing interests-is
the real challenge facing contemporary water institutions. Initially,
although the argument for it has been by implication rather than direct, the management units need to follow basin lines. Management on
other than a basin scale creates the likelihood of externalized costs
and improper consideration of all affected interests. Watching the
ACF states vie with one another in apparent disregard of each other's
interests is a classic case in point.
Whatever is put in place also must start from a base of complete
information-the data on water availability and demand must be accurate and the model of inflows and outflows, including timing, must
be well calibrated. The policy judgments as to allocations among competing state law water users need to be made by the states. The federal
inputs as to policy judgments are limited to matters clearly addressed
by Congress, such as flood control and protection of endangered species. As a major change, Congress has to agree that water for navigation is to be one of the uses that is balanced in the process of determining an optimal pattern of project operations-it cannot trump all
other uses just because it is part of the original authorization of a federal waterways project. The federal imperative and authority must be
available to keep any one of the states from frustrating others, but the
importance of navigation as a competing use of a watercourse has to
be as open to question and curtailment as does any other use of the
water.
There is no one way that a management plan can be drawn or its
content established. What seems most promising is to create an inventory of uses that catalogs the amount and timing of water needed, the
extent to which that use can be accomplished with less water, and the
harm that will ensue-both short term and permanent-if the use is
curtailed in a period of water shortage. The next step is to assign priorities or preferences to uses or sub-sets of those uses. A careful listing
of those sorts of carefully delineated priorities gives a basis for determining a rough guide to what should be the order in which water allocated to the competing uses is curtailed.
The plan needs to be publicly supported, so that generation of the
priorities needs to be through an open and broadly participative
process. The western experience in negotiated water rights settlements
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has clearly taught that all of the stakeholders have to have a seat at the
table. The resulting operations plan ought to give as much notice as
possible of how the water will be managed under varying degrees of
shortage-users are better able to plan their operations if they know
how the managing entity will respond to shortage. Once adopted, the
agency charged with the implementation has to be able to make rapid,
plan-consistent adjustments in response to changes, such as a deepening of drought. Finally, in an era after the demise of stationarity, there
has to be a mechanism that allows for both long-term and emergency
alterations of the plan in the event that the conditions being faced do
not correspond to the conditions that were anticipated and planned
for, or if the system is not performing as expected.
The responsive, rationalist system just described has a bit of a
utopian quality to it, both in obtaining initial agreement and then in
operating up to that level. That is true enough, but the goal is clear
and is one that could command broad assent, and the means of accomplishing the goal can be described with sufficient particularity so
that the resultant product can be readily imagined. Making the exercise less academic, the Delaware River Basin Commission is the current example of an agency that operates in roughly that fashion. In
that case the formal interstate water allocation was imposed by the
United States Supreme Court as part of an equitable apportionment,
but the subsequent management efforts fit the pattern described. Even
the bright line water allocation of the Court has been treated as protective of a first priority interest-New York City's need for water
supply-and not just a numeric entitlement. In crisis, New York has
shown a willingness to accept less than that minimum so long as its
highest priority interests would be protected in the event of modified
operational responses. The new Great Lakes-St. Lawrence approach
also is promising, offering a model where individual states retain
greater control, but overall plan consistency is achieved.
Returning to the immediate topic of the eastern states' water
management, the arguments presented in this Article suggest the
proper role for the Corps is as the facilitator of state water allocation
policy. The eastern states' water policy development should not be left
to the Corps by default, as is now the case. Both as a matter of the
Supremacy Clause and in deference to overriding national policies, a
state water policy needs to be tempered by national interests, such as
flood control, navigation, energy policy, endangered species protection, and floors on water quality. But tempering of state allocation
decisions to co-exist with federal interests, some of which are entrusted to the Corps, is not a justification for making the Corps the
decision-maker. In project after project the Corps has not shown itself
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to be an impartial arbiter of conflicting values. Neither should that
policy choice be left to the Corps under a delegation from Congress.
The Corps is very good at constructing, operating, and maintaining
water facilities. The Corps would likewise be good at effectuating a
plan that incorporates the substantive water policy and water allocation decisions reached through a consensus of the states and the
stakeholders. They are the parties closest to the resource and most
directly affected by good or poor management decisions.
In its first and third eras, deference to states' sovereign water allocation policies was the core of American water federalism. The current controversies, as evidenced by the manner in which they are being contested, suggest a relapse into the second era. The fourth era,
while leaving room for national water use imperatives, should put the
states back in control of water resource pursuant to a rational, adaptive policy-making process that the federal government then helps to
effectuate.

